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THE BUSH COURT
Predicting the Supreme Court's path is always difficult. Who
would have thought that so little judicial doctrine would have
changed after eight years of the Reagan presidency? For that matter, who would have thought that Reagan would have so few
chances to increase the conservative faction on the Court? And
even after years on the bench, the Justices can still surprise us.
Who would have expected Chief Justice Rehnquist, of all people, to
write a trail-blazing decision in the special prosecutor case, going
beyond the specific facts of the case to write a broad opinion restricting the President's removal power?
Still, it's hard to avoid the temptation to speculate about the
Court's future. Let me restrict myself to the most plausible scenario. Suppose George Bush gets to replace one centrist or liberal
with a moderate conservative (as opposed to a Bork). This would
give the conservatives five Justices: Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Justice X. Even if one of the conservatives defects in
a given case, the conservatives can still win by picking up one of the
remaining voters. The odds become quite high in favor of a conservative result in any given case.
The long-term results are harder to predict, even putting aside
the uncertainties of new appointments. There is always the possibility that some member of the conservative block will have second
thoughts. Justice O'Connor, for example, has given some signs of
moving toward the center. As Justice O'Connor's recent health
problem illustrates, there is also always the possibility of an unexpected vacancy.
The dynamics are also complicated by two countervailing
forces. First, judicial doctrines have a momentum of their own.
Decisions that would have been unthinkable in the early years of
the Warren Court became legally plausible after the groundwork
had been laid by other decisions. The issues that a lawyer thinks
are genuinely disputable are in part determined by existing precedent: as that precedent shifts to the right, so does the area of reasonable legal dispute. This momentum factor tends to move the
Court farther and farther away from center.
There is, however, a counter factor. The Court will tend to
move in a given direction until it gets to the point where the initially
dominant coalition begins to split. Once the coalition has consoli-
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dated its position in the areas in which its members agree, the judicial "action" will shift to their areas of disagreement. At this point,
conservative results will be less predicta,ble because the more moderate conservatives will begin defecting. Moreover, new issues are
also likely to arise, on which the dominant block has no consensus,
and these will tend to become focal points of legal dispute.
A similar dynamic could be seen after FDR transformed the
Court in the 1930s. The areas in which the liberal Justices agreed
were swiftly laid to rest. The Court began to become activist in the
civil liberties area, but after a few years, the liberal coalition began
to split in these cases, as the most moderate members like Frankfurter began to defect.
The upshot is that predicting the future of the Court is about
like predicting the weather. Let's put aside any question of the long
term future of the Court, then, and focus on the near future. What
might an increasingly conservative Court be likely to do on some
key issues?
Abortion. There is no doubt that abortion is the most controversial subject before the Court these days. Is the new conservative
Court likely to overrule Roe v. Wade?
One reason this question is hard to answer is that it's not clear
what it means to "overrule Roe." The Supreme Court decided several key issues in Roe. Which one are we talking about here?
The first holding in Roe was that the fetus is not a "person"
under the fourteenth amendment and therefore doesn't have any
constitutional rights of its own. A contrary ruling would mean that
fetuses do have constitutional rights, and would therefore make any
law permitting abortion constitutionally suspect, if not clearly invalid. It seems very unlikely that the Court will take this tack. The
result of this kind of decision "overruling Roe" would be to keep
control over abortion policy in the federal courts rather than the
state legislatures. The conservatives have spent too long complaining of the liberal activism of Roe to turn around and force antiabortion views on the state legislatures. None of the current opponents of Roe on the Court has ever given any indication of a desire
to adopt this course. This part of the Roe holding seems safe.
The second holding in Roe is that abortions have some constitutional protection, so that states may not completely prohibit
them. This aspect of Roe has been harshly criticized on theoretical
grounds by several scholars, including liberals such as John Hart
Ely. Still, it seems unlikely that it will be overruled. For one thing,
the best theoretical arguments against this aspect of Roe attack the
whole concept of a constitutional right to privacy. These arguments
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apply equally to Griswold. But the Bark hearings have made Griswold practically sacrosanct, since Bark came under heavier fire on
this issue than almost anything else. Also, polls show that only a
small portion of the public, roughly 15%, would favor blanket bans
on abortion. Notice how quickly George Bush backed away during
the campaign from the suggestion that women could be punished
for having abortions. Logically, of course, public opinion has nothing to do with the constitutional issue. It seems less probable, however, that the Court would be willing to take a position which is
both inconsistent with precedent and highly unpopular with the
public. Justice O'Connor, who seems to be a key vote on this question, has eschewed this position, a further sign about the Court's
future direction.
The third holding in Roe is the elaborate "trimester system"
the Court established, in which the degree of state regulation becomes progressively greater as the pregnancy advances. Justice
O'Connor has directed most of her fire at this system, and it's hard
to avoid the perception that there is something a bit arbitrary about
these detailed rules. It is here, I think, that a conservative majority
is most likely to take action. Since Roe, the Court has decided a
whole string of decisions, many of them by narrow margins, dealing
with the precise contours of the trimester system: what abortions
are permissible under what circumstances. It would not be difficult
to revamp these decisions under the guise of a "reasonableness" test
of the kind O'Connor has proposed.
My prediction, then, is that the Court will not overturn the
basic holding of Roe prohibiting blanket bans on abortion. Rather,
the Justice will purport to be fine-tuning Roe in the interest of reasonableness. The net effect will be to allow much more state regulation, short of a complete ban.
Affirmative action. Like abortion, affirmative action is a
sharply divisive issue. Several Justices, including Scalia and at one
time Rehnquist, have argued in favor of a strict color blindness
standard, which would prohibit all affirmative action. There are
two reasons for doubting that the Court will go this far.
The first is that complete color blindness makes it more difficult to enforce anti-discrimination laws. Suppose you work in the
central office of some big corporation like General Motors. You
want to ensure that none of your branches are engaging in racial or
gender discrimination. How do you go about achieving this? One
possibility is to review every file individually, to make sure that
every prospective applicant is being fairly treated. This is plainly
impractical. Another possibility is to investigate complaints but
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otherwise remain passive. This strategy will identify blatant individual cases. The problem is that discrimination may take more
subtle forms. The local branch may be able to give a plausible explanation of each individual hiring decision-but the individual decisions always seem to come out in favor of white males.
Investigating individual cases will miss systematic patterns of
discrimination.
The final possibility is to monitor hiring on a statistical basis.
If a branch seems to be hiring a reasonable percentage of blacks or
women in comparison with their share of qualified applicants,
everything seems to be fine. On the other hand, if they are hiring
below that level, further investigation is called for. This seems perfectly reasonable. Of course, the same reasoning applies to anyone
else who wants to police for discriminatory hiring, including civil
rights agencies and the courts.
Once we allow the use of statistics for monitoring purposes,
however, some degree of affirmative action is inevitable. If you are
the local hiring officer, naturally you will want to keep your statistics at the right level, so as to avoid litigation, unpleasant inquiries
from the home office, or just bad publicity. If you haven't hired any
blacks for a few weeks, there's some extra incentive to give the next
black applicant the benefit of the doubt.
The alternative is to get rid of statistical measures of discrimination, by making them inadmissible in court or even forbidding
employers to keep such records. But this would severely impair implementation of the civil rights statutes. It would also require overruling a host of Supreme Court decisions dealing with subjects such
as racial discrimination in jury selection and other forms of racial
discrimination. This seems quite unlikely.
The upshot, then, is that some forms of affirmative action are
probably here to stay. A conservative majority might well want to
trim back somewhat. As Justice O'Connor has suggested, affirmative action could be limited to cases in which there is specific evidence of past discrimination. Thus, the Court could forbid the use
of affirmative action to remedy "societal discrimination" or to
achieve diversity. In fact, while this was in press, the Court took a
major step in this direction in City of Richmond V. J.A. Croson. A
complete ban on affirmative action, however, could not be imposed
without greatly damaging efforts to halt discrimination against racial minorities. As Richmond confirms, the Court does not seem to
be contemplating such a drastic move.
School prayer. The school prayer decisions are quite unpopular. Most people endorse the idea of "voluntary school prayer."
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Nevertheless, here too, I think changes in legal doctrine will be
quite limited.
As the Senate discovered a few years ago in the course of debating a constitutional amendment on the subject, it is one thing to
be in favor of voluntary prayer, but it is quite another to draft rules
permitting it. There are several fairly intractable problems.
First, what kinds of prayers would be permitted? It seems improbable that the Court would allow every kind of prayer, however
sectarian. Could the public schools sponsor student recitals about
the evils of Catholicism, Judaism, or other religions? If not, could
they sponsor prayers that violate the views of specific religious
groups? Affirmative answers to these questions seem quite unlikely,
which means that some limits have to be put on what is allowed in
the way of school prayer.
Second, who would write the prayer? If the prayer is written
by some government body, the result is likely to be unacceptable to
at least some religious groups. There is also something a bit hard to
swallow about the idea of political debate on these issues. What
should be the official religious position of the State of Minnesota?
Deism? Christianity? Fundamentalism? Bad as political campaigns have become in recent years, it would be far worse if candidates were expected to take positions on such matters. But if a
government agency doesn't write the prayer, where does it come
from? Do students bring their own prayers for "show and tell?"
What do we do about student contributions that are highly offensive
to other groups? Can you pray for anything you want (e.g., a revival of the Democratic party? A good grade in math?) Or will the
schools have to set up guidelines for student prayer?
Third, what about voluntariness? Do teachers have to lead
school prayers even if their own religious views forbid them from
doing so? What about students with minority religious views? Presumably there has to be some mechanism for excusing conscientious
objectors, but it's not clear how it should work.
For all these reasons, overruling all of the school prayer decisions would create a terrible legal mess. School prayer continues to
take place in many communities, according to studies by political
scientists, because those communities are religiously homogeneous
and nobody objects. But much of our nation does not fit this description. If the Court opened the door to school prayer, it would
be inviting years of litigation on the limits of its decision.
Before the school prayer decision, there wasn't much controversy about these issues because school prayers were pretty well accepted. But in a sense the school prayer decision was irreversible.
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It legalized the issue, forcing future courts to confront the problems
and establish legal guidelines rather than just ignoring the whole
situation. Once the issue had been legalized, school prayer became
untenable, because there just isn't any satisfactory way to write
legal rules allowing it.
There's an easy way to avoid these problems. Keep the ban on
prayer-but make an exception for silent prayer. You don't have to
write silent prayers; you don't have to worry about their contents;
and any kid who doesn't want to pray can think about the World
Series instead. First amendment purists would be appalled, but the
religious right would be mollified, and relatively little harm would
be done. It's wrong in principle for the schools to set aside time for
silent prayer, but as a practical matter, it wouldn't do much harm.
Even this, however, might require more than one additional conservative vote.
Even on intensely controversial issues like school prayer, affirmative action, and abortion, it seems likely that the Bush Court
will take a moderate stand, trimming back but not overruling key
liberal decisions. There's an even more basic question, however:
how much does it matter?
Lawyers sometimes seem to think that the sun rises and sets on
the Supreme Court. In the real world, it's not clear how dramatic a
difference Supreme Court decisions make. Although Roe has obviously made abortions more accessible, the effect was gradual. Studies show that there were about as many abortions the year before
the Supreme Court decided Roe as there were the following year.
School prayers continued in many places despite the Supreme
Court's edict. In affirmative action, the Bakke case bans quotas in
favor of making race "a factor to be taken into account," but it is an
open secret (in the law school world, anyway) that quotas exist all
the same. Of course, the Court is not an irrelevancy: ask all the
urban children who now ride school buses every day. But the Court
doesn't run the country either, even on the constitutional issues
where it speaks with the greatest authority. Those who are seeking
basic social change, in either direction, might do better to look
elsewhere.
D.A.F.

